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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVACY: ON
BECOMING AND BEING HUMAN
George Anastaplo*
Recognition of the right to privacy is a relatively modern development. Nonetheless, the philosophical, religious, social and
moral underpinnings of our western culture have affected the
manner in which this legal concept has taken shape. In this
Article, Dr. Anastaplo explores the variety of influences that are
present in our concern for privacy, and concludes that our emphasis on individual rights reflects a loss of a sense of
community.
And [Elisha] said unto [his servant]: "Say now unto her:
'Behold, thou hast been careful for us with all this care; what is
to be done for thee? Wouldst thou be spoken for to the king, or
to the captain of the host?' " [The servant spoke to her as he
was ordered.] And she answered: "I dwell among mine own
people."
-2 Kings 4:13
I.

There is inevitable tension, if not even conflict, between
privacy and community. This is evident upon consideration of the
ways of the two ancient peoples from whom so much of the heritage of the West comes down to us.
Thus, the Greek polis made comprehensive demands upon its
members for the sake of the community and of the best. Thus,
also, ancient Israel very much depended, for its survival and for
the development of the best of which it was capable, upon mutual
support and mutual supervision.'
* Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The University of Chicago; Professor of Political Science
and of Philosophy, Rosary College; A.B., J.D., Ph.D., The University of Chicago.
1. This Article has been developed from a talk given on April 27, 1976, at K.A.M. Isaiah
Israel, the oldest Jewish congregation in Chicago. It was given shortly after publication of
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND PERSONAL PRIVACY, STATE OF ILLINOIS,

(1976). [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. The Commission was established and supported by Governor Daniel Walker. I had served the Privacy Commission
as Research Director and Advisor. The opinions expressed in this Article are mine, how-

FINAL REPORT
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An insistence upon privacy, therefore - upon "a right to be let
alone" 2 in one's intimate relations, religious activities, and other
associations - would have been seen by Hellenes and Hebrews
alike to threaten the community in its efforts to develop and
preserve a good life for all. Does not our insistence upon privacy
sometimes disregard both the legitimate claims upon us of community and the natural desire of men to know?
Another way of introducing the problem of privacy, however,
is that which is suggested upon consideration of the ghost of
Hamlet's father which appeared to Hamlet - the ghost who informs a son that his royal father had been murdered and who
commands that son to avenge the murder. Without this ghostly
communication, Hamlet would have taken no action against the
uncle he instinctively despises, the man who is now king in place
of his father.3
Can we not say that everybody would have been better off for
Hamlet's inaction? That is to say, an unnatural visitation (by the
ghost) proved to be most disruptive, upsetting relations within
ever, not necessarily those of the Commission.
Bernard Weisberg served as Chairman of the Privacy Commission; Ellen M. Flaum
served as its Executive Director. The other Commissioners were Doris R. Bernstein, Marvin Chandler, Cyrus Colter, Elliot S. Epstein, Linda R. Hirshman, Don Hyndman, Jack
F. Isakoff, Robert W. McGaw, Wayne Parsons and Ray Stevens. The Commission staff
included, in addition to Miss Flaum and myself, four research associates: Frank Eugene
Kruesi, Sherry Bindeman Schwartz, Stanley R. Solomon and Elizabeth A. Weiner. It was
evident to everyone involved that much of the success of the Privacy Commission was due
to the dedication, cheerful competence and fairmindedness of its chairman, a Chicago
lawyer.
The FINAL REPORT is drawn upon in notes 8, 13. 17, 23, 24, 32, 43, 47 and 48 infra. A
substantial part of this instructive report may be found in Attempt to Reconcile Open
Records and Right to Privacy in Illinois Commission Report, 11 Focus/MIDwEST 16 (No.
68, 1976). The complete report may be obtained by writing to the Chairman, Mr. Bernard
Weisberg, at Room 1500, 120 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60603.
The reader is urged, as with my other publications, to begin by reading the text of this
Article without reference to the notes.
2. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 205 (1890).
See also White, The Right to Privacy, 18 Soc. RESEARCH 171 (1951).
3. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, scene v. (That which I suggest may be "instinctive"
Hamlet dramatically considers to be "prophetic." Id. at 1. 40.) For a discussion of Hamlet

himself, see generally G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT at 30-32, 436-38, 651, 687, 725 (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE CONSTITUTIONALIST] (Corrections for THE CONSTITUTIONALIST may be found in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE
GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM at 130-32 (L. de Alvarez ed. 1976)).

19771

PRIVACY

the community and between various critical people in it. Men do
have a natural desire to know. But would not Hamlet's continued
ignorance have been better for his community on this occasion?'
What, one may well ask, has this to do with the problem of
privacy? And one may well answer, no more, but also no less,
than what the notorious White House tapes have to do with the
problem of privacy. Did not both King Hamlet's ghost and Mr.
Nixon's tapes threaten the general welfare by making public in
an unpredictable manner what would otherwise and naturally
have remained private?5
Are not distortion and a general unbalancing of human relations likely when we have access to and rely upon information
which is normally concealed from view? Does not such access
interfere with normal (even natural) political expectations and
developments? Does it not keep men from making responsible
plans for themselves and for the community they serve? In short,
does it not make chance even more of a problem for the community than it need be? 6
4. Also, "better" would have been a more prudent response by Hamlet to the information provided him by his irresponsible father. On determinations of "better" and "worse"
see Section VII infra.
For an analysis of other unnatural visitations which turned out well, see Anastaplo,
Notes from Charles Dickens' Christmas Carol (to be published in INTERPRETATION Jan.

1978).
5. G. ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN 306 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN
BEING AND CITIZEN]. Mr. Nixon, in minimizing certain unflattering remarks about him
expressed by Henry Kissinger during a dinner conversation, observed: "[T]he only prob-

lem was that he didn't think to turn the microphone off, but on the other hand, I didn't
turn it off either in the Oval Office on occasions, so I never held him for that." N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1977, § A, at 8, col. 6 (city ed.) (second David Frost broadcast segment). This
wry observation suggests, at least to me, that Mr. Nixon may not be beyond redemption.
See also note 7 infra.
6. An unhealthy reliance upon chance may be seen in the publication by the press of
prejudiced remarks which public officials believed they had been making in private. The
most recent instances have involved Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, General George
Brown (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Congressman John Ashbrook. Compare
Politics and Private Conduct, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1976, at 12, col. 1 (editorial). An

appetite for sensation, as well as an exaggerated sense of righteousness, can undermine
among us the relaxed trust necessary for decent political life. Ordinary human (and hence
humanizing) relations are discouraged if one's every remark made in private is considered
fair game by the journalist. See notes 8, 13 & 48 infra.
The political (even presidential) lessons to be learned from ordinary human relations
are suggested in the following letter to the editor I prepared in late April 1977. It was
published in an edited form in the Chi. Tribune, May 7, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 3:
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This is not to defend the misdeed which is subjected to extraordinary exposure - whether the misdeed be a royal assassination
or Presidential misconduct. But the question remains whether,
for example, one invasion of privacy (the Watergate burglary)
justified what may have been the most massive and consequential invasion of privacy in the history of the United States, the
compelled publication of the White House tapes.7 Is a healthy
President Carter, we are told as he finishes his first hundred days in office, is
still learning his job. Even more important than what he has yet to learn,
however, may be what a self-assured man should not forget.
One lesson Mr. Carter should not forget was learned in his home town church.
He evidently did not rely there upon tough "confrontation" responses to his
fellow members' callous positions on race relations. He should remember such
constructive patience as he deals with Congress and with the Russians.
Another "home town" lesson Mr. Carter and his colleagues should not forget
has to do with how one remembers helpful strangers. This test of one's sense of
justice affects one's ability to recruit allies in the future. In such matters, particular illustrations can be instructive.
Consider, for example, the case of Liese Ricketts of Crete, Illinois, a talented
local government official in Republican Will County. She put her political career
on the line in January 1976 when she became a Carter delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Since November she has been cavalierly ignored by
the Carter people who had wooed her, while aggressive latecomers with inferior
credentials are rewarded with posts and honors.
How many such cases are there? Mrs. Ricketts herself does not complain. But
casual ingratitude, like reliance upon gratuitous confrontations, is bad politics
- and bad politics tend to lead to bad government.
See also HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 259-60.
7. On Watergate and its ramifications, see Anastaplo, Passion, Magnanimity and the
Rule of Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 351 (1977). See also my essay entitled "Impeachment and
Statesmanship" in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 160. Of course, Mr. Nixon
himself invaded the privacy of those people who met with him in the White House by
taping their conversations. See note 5 supra.
Richard Nixon, I have argued, "brings out the worst in us." Anastaplo, Abuse of Nixon
Indicates Extent of Public Corruption, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 12, 1976 at 38, col. 1.
Compare id. at 39, col. 1 (editorial). Something of that "worst" may be seen in the
presumptuous coarseness of the following exhortation directed to Mr. Nixon in the first
David Frost broadcast segment:
F: Would you go further than "mistakes?" That you've explained how you got
caught up in this thing . . . you've explained your motives. I don't want to
quibble about any of that, but just coming to the sheer substance, would you
go further than "mistakes?" The word that seems not enough for people to
understand.
N: Well, what would you express?
F: My goodness, that's a . . .I think that there are three things since you asked
me, I would like to hear you say. I think the American people would like to hear
you say: One is . . . "there was probably more than mistakes, there was
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political life possible for us with such systematic exposure of offguard conversations as that publication represented?
I have put the problem of the public interest in privacy this
way, if only to challenge the prevailing opinion about our "right
to know." What is relevant for us to learn about each other? How
does the law bear on this problem? Is the natural desire to know
appropriate for men as human beings, not on all occasions for
men as citizens?
Or, to put all this still another way, what kind of life do we want
for ourselves and for one another?'
wrongdoing." Whether it was a crime or not? Yes, it may have been a crime too.
Secondly "I did . . ." and I'm saying this without questioning the motives,
right? "I did abuse the power I had as President, or not fulfill the totality of
the oath of office." That's ... that's the second thing. And, thirdly, "I put the
American people through two years of needless agony and I apologize for that."
And I say that you've explained your motives. I think those are the categories.
And I know how difficult it is for anyone and most of all you, but I think that
people need to hear it, and I think unless you say it you're going to be haunted
for the rest of your life.
Wash. Post, May 5, 1977 § A, at 17, col. 3. I suspect the "people" who most "need[ed]
to hear it" were Mr. Frost and his associates-and this in order to insure the commercial
success of their venture. (I believe it a dubious practice, by the way, to permit selfaggrandizing entrepreneurs to edit out, for broadcast purposes, two-thirds of an extended
interview. The substance as well as the tone of what was said can thereby be significantly
altered. See notes 29 & 30 infra).
It somehow seems fitting that it is in connection with the Watergate matter, with its
legitimation of unrelenting exposure, that there should be a major break with "the high
court's 188-year tradition of secrecy." Chi. Tribune, Apr. 22, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 4.;
NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1977, at 66. Compare the letter to the editor by Tao, N.Y. Times, May
6, 1977, A, at 28, col. 5 (city ed.).
8. The Illinois Privacy Commission prepared, as one of its recommended bills a "Public
Records Access Act." It also prepared a "School Students Records Act," a "Fair Consumer
Credit Reporting Act" and a "Personal Records Privacy Act," the last relating to records
held by the state government. The School Students Records Act has been enacted. Pub.
Act No. 79-1108, 1976 Ill. Laws [to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 50-5 et seq.].
The texts of all four proposed acts may be found in the Commission's FINAL REPORT.
On the "right to know" see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214-16; Anastaplo, The
Occasions of Freedom of Speech, 5 POLl. Sci. REVIEWER 383, 398-401 (1975); Anastaplo,
Why We Need Access to Our Public Records, Chi. Tribune, July 23, 1976, § 2, at 4, col.
4. See also note 48 infra. Compare Henry James, THE ASPERN PAPERS in THE GREAT SHORT
NOVELS OF HENRY JAMES (P. Rahv ed. 1965). E.g., at 511-12 ("Do you write about him do you pry into his life?"), 523 ("which would have been in the worst possible taste if
anything less vital - from my point of view - had been at stake."), 528 ("Do you think
it's right to rake up the past?"), 530 ("... the last violence of self-exposure..."), 538
(". .. an appetite well-nigh indecent . . ."); 540, 542-43, 545, 547 ("Ah you publishing
scoundrel!"), 552 ("I thought it more decent not to show greed again so soon after the
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II.
The primary definition of "privacy" in the Oxford English
Dictionary reads,
1. The state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of
others, or from public interest; seclusion.
This sense of "privacy" in English seems to go back to the late
Sixteenth Century; it may even go back to the middle of the
Fifteenth Century
Our sense of privacy today is somewhat more assertive than
catastrophe..."), 556 ("In this case it must seem to you that to part with [the papers]

would be an impiety of the worst kind, a simple sacrilege!"), 557 ("But don't let me
stand here as if I had it in my soul to tempt you to anything base."), 558 (" 'She had an
idea that when people want to publish they're capable -. ' And she paused, very red.
'Of violating a tomb? Mercy on us, what must she have thought of me!"), 560 ("I cursed
the extravagent curiosity that had put [a colleague] on the scent of [the papers]"). Are
ruthless invasions of privacy the peculiarly American vice? See id. at 466-67. See also note
6 supra. Does the problem of invasions of privacy reflect the legitimation among us of the
greed of the marketplace? See THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 544, 690-91, 69394. (Justice Black observed that the protections of the First Amendment do not apply to
a " 'merchant' who goes from door to door selling pots!") Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also notes 25, 45 & 47 infra. (I note in
passing that the story we do have about the scholar's efforts to get the Aspern papers is
probably better than anything the papers themselves would have revealed.)
9. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE gives the following definitions for "privacy":
1. State of being secret; secrecy. 2. Retirement; retreat . . . 3. [Privaut6, Fr.]
Privity; joint knowledge; great familiarity. Privacy in this sense is improper
...

4. Taciturnity.

Consider the use of "private" in the following comments on the shepherd's life in
SHAKESPEARE,

As You LIKE IT, Act III, scene ii, 1. 13-18:

Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in respect that it is a
shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it very well; but
in respect that it is private, it is a very vile life. Now in respect it is in the fields,
it pleaseth me well; but in respect it is not in the court, it is tedious." [emphasis
added].
Consider, also, the temptation by Satan of the Son of God with the lure of public
achievements in J. MILTON, PARADISE REGAIN'D at I1, 1.21-30 [emphasis added]:
These God-like Vertues wherefore dost thou hide?
Affecting private life, or more obscure
In savage Wilderness, wherefore deprive
All Earth her wonders at thy acts, thy self
The fame and glory, glory the reward
That sole excites to high attempts the flame
Of most erected Spirits, most temper'd pure
Aetherial, who all pleasures else despise,
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this, more demanding upon the public. Thus, two scholars have
written,'I
The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than
the freedom of the individual to pick and choose for himself the
time and circumstances under which, and most importantly,
the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions
are to be shared with or withheld from others. The right to
privacy is, therefore, a positive claim to a status of personal
dignity - a claim for freedom, if you will, but freedom of a very
special kind.
This sentiment is summed up by them,"
All treasures and all gain esteem as dross,
And dignities and powers all but the highest?
And, in the concluding lines of the poem at IV, 1. 636-39, there is a return by the Hero to
a private station after resistance to all temptations [emphasis added]:
Thus they the Son of God our Savior meek
Sung Victor, and from Heav'nly Feast refresht
Brought on his way with joy; hee unobserv'd
Home to his Mothers house private return'd.
But see Matthew 5:5.
Consider, as well, H. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 478 n.2 (Supp. 1 1962):
In 1935 when Rudyard Kipling's The Light That Failed was being done as a
movie in Hollywood, the author made a number of changes in the script, seeking
to substitute English locutions for Americanisms. Associated Press dispatch
from Hollywood, July 31: "Where Torpenhow says: 'He had some very important personal business,' Kipling's question is, 'What does this word personal
mean?' He substitutes private." So, in English usage, before letter, etc.
For references to "personal privacy" see notes 13 & 48 infra.
10. Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184,
1189-90 (1965). One of these authors was a lawyer, the other the President of the Russell
Sage Foundation. See note 13 infra.
11. Id. at 1198. On the conditions for and the just use of liberty see the talk entitled
"Character and Freedom," in Anastaplo, Passion,Magnanimity and the Rule of Law, 50
So. CAL. L. REV. 351, 370-72 (1977). See also notes 27, 29 & 34 infra.
Consider, on the relation of the just to the legal, von Oppen, Religion and Resistance
to Nazism (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1971):

Let us go back to an earlier stage in the sequence of segregation, deportation,
extermination, which sequence was not known at the time it started, though we
know it now. And let me tell you the case of a school in Holland, a boarding
school where there were, among others, a lot of Jewish children from Germany.
After the Germans had invaded and occupied Holland - and it was all done in
five days in May 1940 - they first ordered the segregation of these Jewish
children, mostly boys and girls in their teens. The segregated children then
consulted those among the staff they trusted most and whose judgment, one
must assume, they trusted most; for even at that stage these children knew that
there were now life-and-death decisions to be made. They asked either one
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The essence of the claim to privacy is the choice of the individual as to what he shall disclose or withhold, and when he shall
do so.

Consider as well the rhetorical question put in a publication
concerned with the implications of computer technology:"
person, A, or another, B. They may, of course, have talked it over with both.
But in the end they accepted the advice of A or B. A advised legality, judging
that evading the prescribed registration would lay that young person open to the
risk of discovery and punishment. A thought the risks of registering as the law
required were less than the risks of the course advocated by B, which was
illegality: going into hiding, probably with forged papers, going "underground"
as they called it, not an easy thing to do in a flat country and, of course,
requiring strong nerves, helpful people to hide you, and the willingness to accept
their help at the risk they would run. About half the young people acted on the
advice of A, about half on that of B. Virtually all who took the advice of A
perished, virtually all who took that of B survived. Yet who could know at the
time who was right?
Id. at 32. The right of revolution is considered throughout Miss von Oppen's report. I
understand, by the way, that when A came to give advice to her own youngster, she gave
the kind of advice B had given. Thus, instinct (or was it common sense?) prevailed over
convention. Is there not also in the right to privacy respect for certain instincts? See text
Section III.
Consider also Berns, PoliticalPhilosophy and the Right to Rebellion, 5 INTERPRETATION
309 (1976). See notes 23, 41, 46 & 51 infra.
12. Privacy and the Computer, at 2 (in Ethical Perspectives, Monograph No. 5; New
York: Publications Committee of the New York Society for Ethical Culture, 1974).
See, on the relation between technology and privacy, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2,
at 195, 206 & 211. The following sources are offered as a sampling of recent discussions
on the subject: 123 CONG. REC. H333 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1977); H959 (Feb. 8, 1977); H1865
(Mar. 8, 1977); E1341 (Mar. 9, 1977); S4841 (Mar. 24, 1977); E2424 (Apr. 25, 1977); S7671
(May 16, 1977); Stanford, What's Happening to Your Privacy?, PARADE, Feb. 27, 1977, at
24; Halverson, Business vs. 'Big Brother' in Privacy Bill (HR 1984), CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 13, 1977, at 11. See also J. MACDONALD, THE LAST ONE LEFr 145-47 (1967):
[Hie realized that ever since he had learned of the new marvels in electronic
espionage, he had been gradually accustoming himself to speak less openly to
everyone in his own offices and in those he visited. He had thought of it as
merely a sensible precaution. If one assumed everything was overheard and
recorded, one could cease worrying about what might be safe to say. It made a
life more drab, more guarded, more ceremonious. All men of any degree of
responsibility had begun to speak for the record, for the unseen audience, and
old intimacies had withered because closeness must depend upon the exchange
of the innermost thoughts. Orwell, in 1984, had not considered the consequences
of such a diffusion. An ever-watchful Big Brother could be outwitted, but a gnatthrong of little brothers could only be endured. Miniaturization of electronic
circuitry was effecting that great change in human relationships which, in other
cultures, had been created only by using secret arrest, imprisonment and torture
to turn brother against brother.
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What will be the effect on each of us when we realize that everything we do is being recorded permanently and can be made
available to any interested party?

One can answer this question by suggesting that the effect would
not be altogether bad, that, indeed, certain salutary consequences can be anticipated from a more detailed knowledge of
one another, a knowledge which can both restrain misbehavior
and identify the lonely (or alienated).' 3
Yet, as is evident in the MacDonald story, electronic "marvels" (as well as fudging on a
lawyer's duty to his client) can be used to see justice done. See also White, supra note 2,
at 182. See notes 6 supra and 13, 15 & 32 infra.
13. See, on alienation and vice, M. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818), and note 38 infra.

Consider also this passage from E.

WILSON, THE WOUND AND THE Bow

39 (1941) [emphasis

addedI:
Friedrich Engels, visiting London in the early forties, had written of the people
in the streets that they seemed to "crowd by one another as if they had nothing
in common, nothing to do with one another, and as if their only agreement were
the tacit one that each shall keep to his own side of the pavement, in order not
to delay the opposing streams of the crowd, while it never occurs to anyone to
honor his fellow with so much as a glance. The brutal indifference, the unfeeling
isolation of each in his private interest, becomes the more repellent the more
these individuals are herded together within a limited space."
Has it not been believed that it would be salutary to have it generally understood "that
everything we do is being recorded permanently" with a view to the Last Judgment? See

H.

BLACK, JR.,

My

FATHER:

A

REMEMBRANCE

175-76 (1975). See also THE

CONSTITUTION-

supra note 3, at 777.
Two principles relied upon by the Illinois Privacy Commission in developing its proposed legislation (note 8, supra) should be noticed here:
The basic problem, it seems to us, is one of control, so much so that we are
obliged to counsel that we probably should not collect what we cannot control.
Unless we are able to govern and regulate the collection, use and dissemination
of personal information, we cannot adequately protect our personal privacy. The
need for such controls has by now been amply documented by Congressional
committees, federal study commissions, professional bodies, and other public
and private research organizations. In addition, we have seen in recent years a
succession of public controversies centering on abuses by government and private business in the collection and handling of personal information about individuals.
ALIST,

FINAL REPORT

supra note 1, at 15-16.

This Commission recognizes the concern expressed by the credit reporting industry that sources can be expected to dry up or become quite cautious if
confidentiality should be explicitly disavowed at the outset of an interview. But
this Commission believes that that consideration must be balanced against the
right of an individual to learn the source of unfair or inaccurate information
about himself. If an individual's opportunities to obtain jobs, credit or insurance
are to be jeopardized by a neighbor's gossip, he should be accorded something
comparable to the time-honored right to know one's accusers. This provision of
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The deeper problem with our attitude toward privacy begins to
emerge when we realize that what we moderns cherish and protect as privacy was not a lively concern for our predecessors in
antiquity. They not only did not discuss it as we do; they often
did not even seem to have had a word for it, which does suggest
that it was for them neither a problem nor an aspiration."4
Consider, for example, the vocabularies of the two peoples already referred to - the ancient Greeks and the ancient Hebrews.
My preliminary inquiries have supported what I had suspected,
that there is in neither ancient vocabulary a word which was in
common use and which can be literally translated as "privacy."
Thus, two rabbis I consulted both had the same initial response
to my question, "Is there a Hebrew word for 'privacy'?" "Of
the bill could encourage healthy restraint upon uninformed and uninhibited
gossip. More responsible sources of information are likely to be developed and
relied upon by credit agencies if the dubious informant is discouraged. If it is
known in advance by everyone involved that individuals are entitled to inspect
the credit files compiled about them, it will be more likely than heretofore that
only information which is morally justified and legally permitted will find its
way into those files.
Id. at 31. See notes 12 supra and 32 infra.
But consider the sensibleness of permitting students to waive access to the letters of
recommendation they request of their teachers. Do not schools tend to be less selfish and
more reliable than credit agencies in passing judgment on the young? Is it primarily
privacy that is desired, or accuracy and just assessments? See PLATo, REPUBLIC 367E-368A.
Consider, also, on the relation of publicity to good behavior, this comment in Dobbert
v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 2290 (1977): "One who is reasonably suspected of murdering his
children cannot expect to remain anonymous." Consider, as well, the concern expressed
to me by the director of an opinion research organization about "the issues which particularly perplex survey research organizations":
For example, even under court order, should we release data collected under
promise of confidentiality? - a particularly difficult question when we are
dealing with patients in a drug abuse rehabilitation program, and ask them (in
effect) to confess to criminal behavior by answering such questions as, "Do you
use drugs? If so, where do you get them?"
More generally, the survey research technology puts us in the difficult intermediate role between government (and its need for information on which to base
rational policy decisions) and the citizen (for whom the collecting of such information involves an intrusion into his privacy).
See notes 10 supra and 43 infra.
Consider, finally, the concern of "the white archivist who found the oldest known
identified photos of black slaves in the United States": ". . .she felt uncomfortable about
the nude pictures, and wondered, 'If these were my ancestors, would I want them to be
seen this way'" Chi. Sun-Times, June 2, 1977, at 48. See note 45 infra.
14. On the significance of "having a word for it" see HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra
note 5 at 8f, 49, 52, 97-101; note 19 infra; and text Section VI.
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course, there surely is," each said - but when pressed, they could
not think of one. The word used today by Hebrew-speaking Israelis is, I understand, essentially a modern adaptation.' I The same
is true of Greek - but with one modification, and that is (as I
understand it) that modern Greek (unlike modern Hebrew) is still
without a word for our "privacy." And this, it is my impression,
does reflect the "outgoing" character of Greek life to this day.I
15. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BABA KAMMA at 27B (I. Epstein, ed. 1935) has
implied in the following passage a word ("stealthily") which suggests an aspect (but not
one of the more engaging aspects) of "privacy": "Do not enter [stealthily] into thy
neighbour's premises for the purpose of appropriating without his knowledge anything
that even belongs to thee, lest thou wilt appear to him as a thief. Thou mayest, however,
break his teeth and tell him, 'I am taking possession of what is mine.'" See also TRACTATE
BABA BATHRA at 2B. In the Middle Ages, I am told, Jewish mystics had a term for going
into seclusion, "hitbod'dut," which some might translate as "privacy." But has not the
dominant opinion in Judaism long been that individual Jews usually had no private
relation with God, that they were all (or almost all) together in whatever relation there
was with God? Compare note 33 infra.
See also HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5 for a discussion of Israel (Essay No.
13, "The Case for Supporting Israel").
16. Ancient Greek has a word, "idiota," which suggests an aspect (but not one of the
more engaging modern aspects) of "privacy": it refers to one who separates himself from
public duties. These additional words should be noted: "eremia" (solitude), "oikia"
(household), "katidion" (according to one's own), "monasmos" (living alone), and the
words formed with "auto" such as "autites," (to be by oneself). Consider, as well, the
concern with the "auto," (the self) with which Plato's PHAEDO, in its examination of the
possible immortality of the soul, literally begins. See HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note
5 at 319, note 7 supra and note 28 infra. The complexity of the Greek understanding of
these things is further suggested by Nietzsche's distinction between Apollo (with the
principium individuationis,which is related to subjectivity) and Dionysus (with complete
self-forgetfulness). F. NEITZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY, 36-37, 38, 40, 45-46, 48-49, 50-51

(1967). A useful introduction to Neitzsche is provided by W.
VIEW OF SOCRATES (1974).

DANNHAUSER, NEITZSCHE'S

In modem Greece, the tendency is to share all one has with one's "in-group," from
whom one gets in turn support and criticism. It is expected that all know one another quite
well in that group. (The American visitor can be startled to find himself asked, by new
acquaintances, the most intimate questions about his financial circumstances and family
relations.) In modern Greek, there are words for secrecy ("mistikotis"), separateness,
("idiateros") and loneliness ("monohikotis").
Something of the Middle Eastern (and hence Greek?) way of life and its lack of privacy
within the household is suggested by the protest of a harried Saudi Arabian official: "I
work all day and it isn't easy. It's one. decision after another and government life is one
long fight. Must I fight at home every night? [My wife] says I don't talk to her. When
am I supposed to talk to her? It's part of our way of life to have an open house with friends
walking in at any time. I can't lock our door against them to make time to talk to her.
And I don't want to. What else is there that matters in life but your friends and your
family?" It is further reported that one of this official's friends is building a three million
dollar home in Riyadh: "This will be that other man's first home of his own. He and his
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The origins of the English word seem to go back to the Latin
privatus, where it seems to have referred to a deprivation or release or setting apart. 7 I suspect that there was something about
later Roman political (and, still later, religious) developments

which made it not uncommon and somehow respectable if not
even desirable that one step aside from communal activities.'
III.
The modern notion of privacy 9 ultimately draws, I suspect,
wife started in a large family compound with all his brothers and cousins and their
families, a place teeming with people and protective warmth. Now they share a house with
just one brother's family. The next step is the [new] house on the hill - one man, one
wife, three children. The empty marble house will seem like a mausoleum to him." Chi.
Tribune, June 12, 1977, § 5, at 1, col. 5 (report by Linda Blandford). Compare notes 40 &
42 infra.
On modern Greece see my articles in the Fifteenth Edition of the ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (1st & 2nd printings); HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, Essay No. 1,
"Dissent in Athens"; THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 564.
17. The Illinois Privacy Commission in FINAL REPORT supra note 1, at 6, drew its epigraph from the following deeply instructive passage in the essay on Kurt Riezler in L.
STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? 260 (1959):
Riezler's analysis of the passions culminates in his analysis of shame and awe
as respect for the vulnerable and the secret. Human dignity, Riezler suggests
among other things, stands and falls by shame and awe because man's greatness
is co-present in his littleness and his littleness is co-present in his greatness. It
was ultimately because he grasped the meaning of shame and awe that Riezler
was a liberal, a lover of privacy. By invading men's privacy one does not come
to know them better - one merely ceases to see them. For man's being is
revealed by the broad character of his life, his deeds, his works, by what he
esteems and reveres not in word but in deed - by the stars for which his soul
longs if it longs for any stars. Not anguish but awe is "the fundamental mood"
which discloses being as being. Because he was animated by this spirit, he felt
more at home in the thought of ancient Greece than in the thought of his time.
The serious student of privacy, with Mr. Strauss's essay to build upon, should study,
among other things, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2; White, supra note 2; the useful
writings in this field of Alan F. Westin and Arthur R. Miller; Kalven, The Problem of
Privacy in the Year 2000. DAEDULUS 876 (Summer 1967); H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). See also Essays Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9 in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra
note 5. For a collection of authors influenced by Mr. Strauss, see A Contemporary Bibliography in Political Philosophy and in Other Areas. It may be obtained from Mr. Harvey
Lomax, ed., 4215 Glenaire Drive, Dallas, Texas, 75229.
18. "On that celebrated ground, the first consuls deserved trimphs; their successors
adorned villas, and their posterity have erected convents." E. GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, vol. I, at 20 (Modern Library ed.) See also Essay No. 2, on
PLATO'S APOLOGY in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5; note 39 infra.
19. The emergence of new words, or the development of new meanings for old words,
can reveal the presuppositions and inclinations of an age. Consider, for example, our use
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upon attitudes among men about the exposure of the private
parts of the body, the exposure of those parts which men normally
keep covered.20 Something of this natural modesty may be seen
in what is said in Genesis both about the nakedness of which
Adam and Eve became aware and about the responses by Noah's
sons to their father's nakedness."'
The grounding of privacy in the natural modesty of civilized
beings seems to have been lost sight of by us." Symptomatic of
this forgetting is what may well be the most traumatic invasion
of privacy routinely experienced among us today, and that is the
compulsory nudity required of high school (and even of some
grade school) children in physical fitness and athletic programs.23
of "the masses" when the ancients might have said "the many" or "the mob" or "the
people;" or our use of "mature" or "adjusted" or "secure" when the ancients might have
said "virtuous" or "good;" or our use of "state" and "society" and "church" when the
ancients might have said "community" or "polls." I suspect that the shifts in these three
sets of cases have something in common with the emergence of privacy among us, reflecting thereby a quite changed view of human life.
On the discipline of language, see Section VI, infra. On the standards to which that
discipline should be dedicated, see text Section VII, infra.
20. What is the relation of respect for privacy to the recognition of a male-female
distinction? And when that distinction breaks down, as in the "Nighttown" sequence in
James Joyce's ULYSSES, is not respect for privacy likely to be weakened? (The male-female
distinction is reflected in the institutions of family life: thus, female fidelity guarantees
heredity; and modesty serves fidelity. See notes 33 & 38 infra.)
21. Genesis 2:25 and 3:7; Genesis 9:20-7.
22. Does the doctrine of Original Sin draw upon the natural modesty of civilized beings?
Does it distort this modesty? See note 25 infra.
23. Thus, I have heard of a German woman who, upon coming to the United States as
a teenager, was appalled to find that her college gym class took nudity for granted. She
left it after the first day, never to return. And I have talked with a German criminologist
who was shocked both by the crowding and by the "cages" (that is, the cells) evident in
the Cook County Jail and in Joliet Prison. In Germany, he reported, prisoners are kept in
rooms with doors, with (at most, but often with not even) a peephole in the door. (One
can appreciate from such German responses - both to nudity and to prison cells - how
unhuman the Jews must have been regarded by the Germans who systematically exterminated them by the millions. Otherwise, wholesale slaughter becomes "unbelievable." On
the truly human, see note 11 supra and text Sections VI and VII infra. On G. Lessing's
NATHAN THE WISE, see THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 503.

See, on viewing and being viewed naked,

PLATO, LAWS

772a;

THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA

(E.

Surtz, ed. 1964). We are told by the narrator Raphael that "nothing is private" in Utopia.
Id. at 146. Is this because of the critical importance of that "one single monster, the chief
and progenitor of all plagues . . . Pride"? Id. at 150. (Raphael disparages private property. Id. at 16-19, 53-5. Compare id. at 151. But he does like to live as he pleases [which
property, and hence privacy, permits]. Id. at 17-18.) Is not philosophy dependent on what
we know as privacy? Id. at 4. See notes 31 and 51 infra.
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Failure to respect the grounding of privacy in natural modesty
may be seen in still another, and in many ways more serious
(albeit less obviously traumatic), development - and that is in
the growing toleration among us of the most blatant obscenity.
The toleration of obscenity is often put in terms of individual
choice - but it is nevertheless a development which affects
everyone in the community, almost as much those who would not
choose obscenity for themselves as thos who not only choose it but
actively seek it. This coarsening development affects very much
the language, the conversation and the concerns of the day.24
Many of the people who have been in the forefront of the effort
to protect privacy have also opposed legal (and sometimes even
social) restraints upon obscenity. Yet, does not obscenity repudiate the respect for that concealment of the private parts upon
which privacy is somehow grounded? Does not widespread obscenity tend to undermine among us the sanctity of the private?25
Be all this as it may, the Illinois Privacy Commission did include among its recommendations that further study be made of "the need for and objections to compulsory 'public'
FINAL
disrobing by school children in pre-collegiate physical education classes .
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
24. In respectable shops in Chicago's Loop opaque masks are used to cover certain
"girlie" magazines offered for sale. The masks are there, one is told, to save female
customers from embarassment. The concluding recommendation of the Illinois Privacy
Commission reads:
Finally, it is recommended by this Commission that there be established, at
least once a decade, a temporary privacy commission composed for the most
part of private citizens. Each such commission should survey enduring as well
as emerging privacy problems in this State; suggest appropriate legislation; call
public attention to coarsening "cultural" developments threatening those
human sensibilities upon which an abiding respect for privacy rests; define
privacy-related matters in need of extended study; and otherwise assess, correct
and continue the work of its predecessor privacy commissions.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1 at 50 [emphasis added].
25. See THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 546; Essay No. 10, "Obscenity and
Common Sense" in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5 at 117. Consider the opening
paragraph of a review by Virginia Wright Wexman in the Chi. Reader, May 6, 1977, at
15, col. 1: "'Do you enjoy watching us?' Sada, the heroine of In the Realm of the Senses,
asks a serving maid at one point in the film. It's an embarrassing question for the audience
as well as for the maid, because we've been sharing the maid's view of an activity normally
relegated to normal privacy: sexual intercourse." Consider also the devastating review by
Bruno Bettelheim in THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 1976, at 31, of a movie which presumed
to exploit concentration camp atrocities for their "comic" effects. (A juvenile version of

his kind of exploitation may be seen in

MEL BROOKS' YOUNG FRANKENSTEIN.)

Consider as
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All this suggests that when we plead for privacy, at the same
time that we support those who share with us their obscenities,
we do not really understand what it is we are asking for. The
connection between an insistence upon privacy and the protection of (if not even indulgence in) obscenity is, however, not accidental. For privacy is, in certain respects, an affirmation and
gratification of the "self," of that individuality which is so much
a product of modern times. We have legitimated among ourselves
an emphasis upon self - and hence upon self-expression and selfgratification - and this, in turn, easily leads to such experiments
in self-gratification and self-expression as obscenity. These experiments in language and in conduct threaten the very privacy
which serves the self.26
well the review by Irving Howe in THE

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 23, 1975 at 3, of
the publication of the most intimate letters written by the young James Joyce to his wife.
The "sanctity of the private" should remind us of piety. See text Section V infra. We
should also be reminded that Justice Douglas could speak of "the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms" and of marriage as being "intimate to the degree of being sacred."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486 (1965). (On privacy and sexual relations,
see AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1976) at 245-46, 577, 579-80, 58182, 586-87, 590f). Certainly, we should be reminded that the relation of "prurient curiosity" to invasions of privacy has long been recognized. See e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 2, at 196, 220. See also notes 8 supra and 47 infra.
The Ann Landers column in the Chi. Sun-Times, May 1, 1977, (see section entitled
"Living") at 4, col. 1 is largely devoted to "the questions [put by journalists] that don't
need to be answered." Compare, at page 15 of the same section, another article in which
such intimate questions are thought fair game for the journalist. (It should be added that
features such as the Ann Landers column have helped break down resistance to the public
discussion of intimate matters. A "natural" culmination may be seen in a report in the
Chi. Sun-Times, May 15, 1977, at 2, col. 2: "Two Massachusetts Institute of Technology
coeds have created a campus furor by publishing a 'Consumers Guide to MIT Men' in
which they rated the sexual performances of 36 male students by name, awarding each
from four stars to none.") For a discussion of the concept of "an ultimate sanctity of the
individual as individual," see THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 734.
On the need for a cautious approach to anti-pornography legislation see 123 CONG.
REC. E3059 (May 17, 1977). See also, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5 at 290; H.
BLACK, JR., supra note 13, at 184-86; note 52 infra.
26. See, on the "self," Essay No. 7, "In Search of the Soulless 'Self," in HUMAN BEING
AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 87. Much is made of a "right to one's personality" and of
"an inviolate personality" in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. at 205, 207, 211 & 213.
(Consider persona, the mask behind which there may be nothing?) "Self," "personality"
and "individuality" seem to be terms intimately related to one another. Compare note 28
infra. GOETHE'S SORROWS OF YOUNG WEATHER celebrates the emotional revelations of the
private individual; AUGUSTINE'S CITY OF GOD can speak of pride and the rule of self (see,
e.g., id. at 5, 404-05, 410, 471, 477, 551-52, 555, 572-73, 575, 590, 592-93, 852, 857, 891, 1022,
1065; compare id. at 247, 253, 285, 293, 359-60, 415, 487, 510, 1022f). (Andy Capp can be
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But it is not this threat to the private by self-indulgence which
is central to discussions today of the problem of privacy. Rather,
the principal threat is said to be posed by the "prying" of large,
impersonal government agencies and by non-government organizations (including the mass media) which are themselves so important and so pervasive as to have many of the powers and
effects of government. Thus, government and government-like
intrusions are dreaded as threats to the precious individuality of
the self.27
told by his wife, in the comic strip of Mar. 20, 1977, "You've got no consideration for me.
All you think about is self, self, self.") And a baseball player reports:
Losing breeds individuality, and that's the big difference I noticed [at Oakland]. When I was with the Cubs the first time, you might be in the bullpen
cheering out loud for your guy on the mound to do well, but down deep, maybe
you were hoping he'd get rocked. That's selfishness. In Oakland, there wasn't
any of that, and there were a lot of guys who didn't play. But it was a team,
everybody pulling for everybody, and that's why it worked.
Chi. Tribune, Mar. 25, 1977, § 4, at 2.
Consider also, Milton Mayer's observation in his article entitled Defense of Dialogue,
THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1977, at 12, 14:
. . . What disheartens dialogue. . . is (a) the demand for the immediacy of the
relevance and (b) the need to exclude the time and the place in favor of the
person. If it didn't happen within his little span of individual experience, it
didn't happen. Others are bent, like him, on finding themselves, but the possibility of communication (much less communion) among them is negligible because each is lost in his own immediate forest. Cut off from the total stranger
next to him, he is, of course, cut off from all the total strangers who have gone
before him. His only reference point to goodness, truth, and beauty is the eye
of the beholder, individuated, incommunicado.
See text Section VII infra.
27. A man in the country concludes, "I'm going to get my solitude and rural peace in
the only place where they can be found in France, a fourth-floor apartment off the Champs

Elyseds."

STENDHAL, RED AND BLACK

185 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969). But

may not solitude (or privacy) sometimes be purchased at the cost of humanity? Consider
RousSEAU, THE FIRST AND SECOND DIsCouRsEs 132 (R. Masters, ed., New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1964):
In fact, commiseration will be all the more energetic as the observing animal
identifies himself more intimately with the suffering animal. Now it is evident
that this identification must have been infinitely closer in the state of nature
than in the state of reasoning. Reason engenders vanity and reflection fortifies
it; reason turns man back upon himself, it separates him from all that bothers
and afflicts him. Philosophy isolates him; because of it he says in secret, at the
sight of a suffering man: Perish if you will, I am safe. No longer can anything
except dangers to the entire society trouble the tranquil sleep of the philosopher
and tear him from his bed . . . . Savage man does not have this admirable
talent, and for want of wisdom and reason he is always seen heedlessly yielding
to the first sentiment of humanity.
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IV.
When we talk of individuality and the self, we are of course
resorting once again to modern terminology - in this case to
language which refers to what would once have been called "the
soul." 2 And in so doing we are apt to fail to appreciate, or even
to notice, the role of the community in shaping us, in determining
the kind of souls we have. Thus, we do not seem to realize that
we may have choices in determining the character we are to have.
We no longer seem to realize, for example, that our literature
helps make us the people we are and that it may very much be a
legitimate communal concern what that literature does and what
it undoes.29
Similar sentiments may be found in Nietzsche's THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY. See note 51 infra.
Stendahl observes, at the conclusion of RED AND BLACK at 408: "The great disadvantage
to the reign of public opinion, which does achieve freedom, is that it meddles in matters
where it does not belong, for example: private life. Hence the gloom of America and
England ....
"See note 11 infra.
The true philosopher, it should be added, is aware of the conditions for the community
which makes philosophy possible. See notes 31 & 41 infra. Compare notes 33 & 35 infra.
See also note 52 infra.
28. Is "self" that aspect of the soul which emphasizes particular experiences, not that
which is universal and hence the same in all reasonable beings? It is pointed out in Plato's
LAWS at 903 that creation is not primarily for man's benefit; he himself exists for the sake
of the universal. See note 16 supra.

See, in the index for

HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN,

supra note 5, the entries for

"individualism," "self"' and "soul" (for example id. at 317 n. 4). See also THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 437, 672, 691, 734, 771-73, 789, 790.
29. See Anastaplo, Self-Government and the Mass Media: A PracticalMan's Guide,
in THE MASS MEDIA AND MODERN DEMOCRACY, (H. Clor ed. 1974) (an extended argument
for the total abolition of broadcast television in the United States). Compare Sharp, Self
and Soul, 2 U. CHI. LAW ALUMNI J. 29, 30 (1976) (a review of HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN).
See also notes 7 supra and 30 infra.
I had occasion in December 1976 to prepare the following assessment of the American
Civil Liberties Union (a most useful association):
One critical problem with the A.C.L.U. is that it promotes a sense of continuous crisis. If one is not able to appreciate the remarkably good shape civil
liberties are in today, one may not be able to recognize and respond properly to
truly serious threats when they again develop.
Another critical problem (and, indeed, a crisis worth taking seriously) is that
the A.C.L.U. does not address itself to the steady deterioration among us in
language, in the communal sense of discipline, and in authoritative traditions.
That is, it does not recognize any obligation to concern itself with the character
appropriate to a people entrusted with unprecedented powers of selfgovernment.
See notes 11 supra and 51 & 52 infra.
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To speak of a legitimate communal concern is particularly difficult in times when a foolish war has made the community even
more questionable than it would normally be in an age which
finds individuality in the ascendancy." But is not the tendency
to encourage everyone to look out for himself apt to promote an
unhealthy and irresponsible sense of privacy? Is not the emphasis
apt to be placed not upon what is aimed at - the full development of the human being - but rather upon what is to be
avoided? Such an emphasis is not likely to contribute to a social
order in which the human soul can truly flourish. 3
What is to be avoided? Perhaps, most of all, there is among us
the desire to avoid the feeling that there is no way of escaping
surveillance. The computer, of which so much is heard in privacy
discussions, reinforces the feeling in modern life that there is no
place to hide. 3 The realization of this may make us, more than
30. For a discussion of this war see Essay No. 12, "Vietnam and the Constitution," in
HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 151. A society which sacrifices community to
mere individuality can undermine significant individuality itself:
The development of society [since Wordsworth] was making life, for the great
mass of men, more and more uniform, and it has since made poetry, a few
centuries ago known and enjoyed in every peasant community, a thing which is
written for the few, while the mass of the people now read the news and go to
the cinema, or sit before a television set.
E. MUIR, THE ESTATE OF POETRY at 7 (1962). (What "sit[ting] before a television set" can
mean should be evident upon considering the difference between watching a baseball
game on television and seeing it at the ball park: at the park one can choose and is able
to follow the more subtle developments of the game; the camera, on the other hand,
emphasizes the more easily observable and hence more public "action." See notes 7 and
29 supra. See also C. Lasch, The Corruptionof Sports, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
24-25 (Apr. 28, 1977)).
31. An emphasis on what is to be avoided reminds one of Thomas Hobbes and, behind
him, Lucretius. Does an excessive concern with self-preservation lead to indulgence in selfexpression (and hence to sentimentality)? See THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at
171-73. Compare Hobbes' LEVIATHAN in chapter 46: "And this private measure of good, is
a doctrine, not only vain, but also pernicious to the public state." (This is said in the
context of a discussion which distorts the Aristotelian teaching of the definition of good
and evil. See text Section VII infra.).
It is the full development of the human being, in which the entire community somehow
shares, which justifies, if anything does, the philosopher's recourse to the private life. See
PLATO, REPUBLIC 330a. See also notes 23 & 27 supra and 41 & 51 infra.
32. One is reminded, of course, of GEORGE ORWELL, 1984. See also note 12 supra. The
Illinois Privacy Commission commented:
It should be emphasized that the concern today for privacy and the need to
protect the individual against improper use and dissemination of personal information about him remain whether or not the information is computerized. But
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was once true, want to hide. Of course, the citizens of ancient
communities were very much in public; they were quite well
known to one another. But there were at least two critical differences from our circumstances today. Those citizens had never
had nurtured in them the same sense of privacy we have. 3 And
those citizens seem to have had the feeling that they knew better
than we feel we know ours, the government by which they were
ruled (even when their government was the most repressive in
practice and our government has been the most benevolent in
intention).
In a genuine community, one can put up with considerable
gossip and nosiness. Indeed, these aggressive forms of caring may
even be useful, in that they help to promote moral standards and
to protect salutary conventions. But we do not want gossip to
become institutionalized and turned into "hard facts," into data
which can be filed away and given official sanction. There is
about this something cold-blooded, inhuman and hence inaccurate and misleading. Intimacy is undermined and we become
34
strangers to one another.

the widespread and rapid growth of computerized information systems-systems which increase considerably our ability to collect, store, manipu-

late and disseminate information-has dramatized the urgent need to adopt
protective regulations.
Furthermore, the current state of computer technology is such that the information storage and retrieval capabilities of computerized systems presently
operating far surpass developments in control techniques, especially with respect to processing from remote data entry terminals. Consequently, it may
often be technologically impossible for many automated information systems to
comply with existing or proposed legislative controls. The representations as to
safeguards made on behalf of some systems may not be presently susceptible of
independent verification. In short, the controls anticipated by many legislative
proposals go beyond existing computer practices and, as to certain problems,
beyond existing technology.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15. (This passage continues in note 13 supra). See also
THE NEW YORKER at 35 (Aug. 22, 1977).
33. Our sense of privacy may go back, ultimately, to the Christian notion that each of
us is responsible for the salvation of his immortal soul. Compare notes 15 supra and 39
infra. Consider the relation between respect for privacy and the status of virginity since
the advent of Christianity. Compare Thomas Hardy's poem, "The Ruined Maid."
"It was, no doubt, difficult for so great a philosopher [as Porphyry] either to acknowledge all this society of demons or to censure them with confidence, whereas any Christian
old woman would have no hesitation about the fact of their existence, and no reserve about
denouncing them." AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 387. See also id. at 404-05, 498-500, 561, 594,
854-57, 879, 891, 971-74, 979-82, 1065, 1068, 1089-90. Compare notes 27 supra and 41 infra.
34. Oral gossip seems to be bearable. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196, 217.
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But we are, by and large, prosperous and pampered strangers.
That is to say, we do want many of the benefits of the technology
which threatens both our sense of community and the sense of
privacy with which we seek to compensate for the loss of community. Certainly, it does not seem likely that men will deliberately dismantle the technology which makes them so comfortable, especially in circumstances where that technology also contributes to their defense against other men who have an advanced
technology of their own.
And so desperate measures are resorted to in an effort to have
both modern technology and the old-fashioned sense of community. The most radical Twentieth Century experiments to this
end have not been happy ones, however illustrious some of their
supporters have been. Indeed, they have even been inhuman perversely and deeply inhuman - in their efforts either to mechanize the community or to subject technology to complete community control. 5
Be that as it may, it should be evident from what I have said
that the really serious problem today may not be the invasion of
privacy (unsettling though that may be) but the undermining
Has privacy become for us something of a substitute for intimacy? If, because of our
numbers and mobility, we cannot have solid knowledge of one another - if we cannot be
properly known - do we prefer "to be let alone"?
And yet there is much to be said for our technology. I, for one, continue to marvel at
how easy it is to rent a new automobile for days or weeks at a time. That is, one can be
entrusted with the automobile (sometimes within a matter of minutes) by strangers who
believe themselves to have readily available to them reliable data with respect to one's
trustworthiness. The technology which makes such data available is something we have
become quite used to. Indeed, this technology has become almost a second nature for us.
Such familiarity means, among other things, that one can drive thousands of miles without having to honk one's horn - or having had to be honked at. (Consider, on the uses
made of technology to recover some of the privacy that technology has stripped us of: "The
one thing whose efficacy I'm dubious about in the Carter proposals," says the editor of
the Privacy Journal, "is the plan to increase the gas tax in order to promote car pooling
and the use of mass transit. A lot of people are going to be willing to pay an extra fifty
dollars a year for the privilege of driving to work by themselves. That's because a lot of
people have their families at home and work in offices where the partitions don't run all
the way to the ceiling. Driving to and from work is the only privacy many people have."
THE NEW YORKER, at 30 (May 30, 1977)). See notes 43 & 50 infra.
35. See, in the index for THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, and for HUMAN BEING
AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, the entries for Martin Heidegger. For a reminder of what an
excessive regard for "community" can do to education, see Swearer, Higher Education in
Contemporary China, THE KEY REPORTER 2 (Winter 1974-75). See note 27 supra.
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among us of a sense of community. And what community is and
should be depends, in turn, upon a sound awareness of what the
human soul is like, what it needs for its nurture, what it looks like
in its perfection." But it is difficult, in an age which has so spectacularly devoted itself to the conquest of nature (for that is what
our technology means),3 7 to speak effectively of the human soul
and of right and wrong - for these things do depend upon an idea
of and a respect for nature. The nature of the soul, the nature of
reason and the nature of morality have to be dealt with.3"
All this is not to say that we should not take seriously the
privacy problems we confront. It is to suggest that those problems
should be seen for what they are, symptoms of even deeper problems, problems which may be inevitable so long as we follow (for
good reasons as well as bad) the way of life we now happen to
have. It is also to suggest that the standards to be applied in these
matters are not derived, ultimately, from what we know as "the
right to privacy."
It is to these suggestions I now turn by returning to the ancients
who did not speak much (if at all) of privacy.
36. It has been said, "This is what Abraham did. He forsook community and deception
to live with Truth in solitude." A. HESCHEL, A PASSION FOR TRUTH 21 (1973). See also id.
at 322. But once Abraham did whatever he did, in an authoritatively dramatic way, he
could then form an enduring community? See id. at 74, 227. See note 42 infra.
37. On the conquest of nature see Berns, An Introduction to the Political Philosophy
of Francis Bacon, (Ph.D. diss., The Univ. of Chi., 1957). See also, 117 CONG. REC. H12557
(Dec. 14, 1971); 120 CONG. REc. E6228 (Oct. 2, 1974); J. CROPSEY, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND THE ISSUES OF POLITICS 221f, 252f (1977).
38. This discussion anticipates Sections VI and VII infra. I observe, in the concluding
passage of a talk, "Victims and Vices in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein" (May 14, 1977):
Frankenstein's presumptuous enterprise covers some seven years. On the other
hand, [the narrator's] enterprise - the period covered by his letters home
about his mission - takes some nine months. That is, Frankenstein's story
[about his creation of the monster and the consequences of that creation] is
set in the frame of that nine-month experience of the narrator. One should be
reminded here, of course, of the normal gestation period for bringing forth new
human life. (This does not seem to have been noticed by the critics, evidently
because they have not taken seriously enough the "frame" of the story.) Thus,
it can be said, the nine-month frame of the story is a tacit reaffirmation of the
female principle in human relations and, indeed, of nature and the nature of
things . ...
See note 20 supra.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:767

V.

The ancients, I indicated at the outset of these remarks, were
not by and large private men. They were members of communities. They were citizens. It has not been the citizen's way of addressing public issues to put them in terms of the right to privacy.3"
The ancient citizen, when he found himself in conflict with his
community, invoked not the right to privacy but rather (in most
cases) one of three things: the family, nature or the divine. All
three of these have become suspect among us, as has the community itself. Family ties have been undermined by modern mobility and by democracy (which teaches children that they can
say and do to their parents what their parents say and do to
them); 0 the philosopher (the student par excellence of nature)
has been confused with the intellectual (who tends to be irresponsible, relativistic and determinedly optimistic);41 and the gods are
either so diminished or so "dehumanized" and hence undisciplined and undisciplining as to have become inconsequential.42
39. Is privacy to the bourgeoisie what patriotism is to citizens? Does the desire for
privacy become extreme, against the community, only after the sense of community
breaks down (that is, only after the community changes radically in character)? See note
18 supra and note 40 infra. Privacy may also rise in importance as religion declines - but
this may be partly because those who exercise power become "uninhibited." See THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 688, 782. Does privacy appeal to and reinforce the
sense of worth that certain religions can better minister to in most people? See notes 33
supra and 50 infra.
See Berns, Two Old Conservatives Discuss the Anastaplo Case, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 920,
921 n. 4 (1969); Bloustein, The FirstAmendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court and
the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1974). See also notes 45 & 46 infra.
40. Shame and awe (note 17 supra) may depend upon the family. See note 20 supra.
We have seen the right to privacy, which may have originally been a right exercised by
the family against "the others," routinely invoked by the child against his own family.
See ARISTOPHANES'S CLOUDS. See also notes 16 & 39 supra and note 42 infra.
41. On the limits of intellectuals see my book review in 9 Sw. U. L. REv. 273 (1977).
See also Anastaplo, Passion, Magnanimity and the Rule of Law, 50 So. CAL. L. REv. 351
(1977). Philosophy supports resistance to the demands of government (or of governmentlike organizations) both for the sake of the common good and for the sake of philosophy
itself. Thus, political philosophy provides trustworthy grounding for those challenging the
community's judgment in the name of better government. (This is reflected in the Declaration of Independence and its right of revolution.) On the other hand, philosophy in itself
is concerned about the conditions for philosophizing (and for this, some privacy, at least
for the student of philosophy, is critical). See White, supra note 2, at 194f. See also notes
11, 23, 27 & 31 supra; notes 51 & 52 infra.
42. In the best of times, family, philosophy and the divine more or less cooperate with
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It is instructive and salutary to try, in every case where the
right to privacy is invoked today, to determine how the problem
involved would have been addressed by the thoughtful citizen
heretofore. The various things which we gather together under the
banner of "privacy," the ancient citizen might have seen as raising the problem of love or the problem of wisdom or the problem
of piety. He might, if pressed, have even reduced all these to the
problem of wisdom, but wisdom as concerned primarily with the
virtue of justice.43 Such wisdom understands and makes due aleach other under the aegis of the community. See on shame and awe, note 17 supra. (What
is the-relation between deception and community? See PLATO, REPuBLIc, 414-15; also note
36 supra.) I have had occasion, in a recent letter to a social scientist, to make these
observations:
* . . A respect for evidence, it seems to me, should make one realize how difficult
it is to pass judgment on what happens in others' families. Marriage, as you also
must realize, is most difficult to assess, and to assess with propriety, from the
"outside."
Be that as it may, it can be a mistake to make too much of happiness (as
ordinarily understood) in assessing a prospective marriage. Indeed, it may be
closer to the truth to say that the critical consideration (in the arrangement of
any marriage) can well be something as old-fashioned as courtesy. This can be
vital to domestic tranquillity (among the various parties involved) and hence
to the enduring happiness of the couple itself.
Courtesy, in turn, may be related to the notion of piety. But now, I fear, I
expose myself as hopelessly old-fashioned.
Curiously enough, the problem of piety may also be of some importance to
the capital punishment issue [we have been discussing]. Consider in this
connection my tentative opinions on the subject, as suggested in the enclosed
review of Elmer Gertz's To Life.
(For the Gertz review, see note 52 infra.) The courtesy referred to is particularly critical
in one's dealings with one's elders. Discourtesy can be seen, for example, in the selfcentered replacement of one set of elders or "authorities" (determined by nature) by
another which is more permissive or less challenging. See HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra

note 5, at xi-xii.
On the relation of obscenity to piety see HUMAN BEING AND CmZEN, supra note 5, at 290.

43. For us, the problem of justice is perhaps most conveniently reflected in our understanding of property. What property can mean to us is suggested by the fact that a San
Antonio woman could arrange to have herself buried "in her best lace nightgown and
seated in her Ferrari." Chi. Tribune, May 20, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2. It is also suggested
by the following comment by the Illinois Privacy Commission in FINAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 48:
Financial disclosure requirements came in for repeated discussion by the Commission as it received inquiries and complaints by individuals who believed that
the required disclosure was a serious invasion of their privacy. Although the
Commission recognizes the need to promote confidence in the integrity of public
servants, it is obliged to wonder whether the present financial disclosure requirements discourage many worthy citizens from government service and whether
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lowance for the nature of things, including a recognition by reasonable men of the proper place in a community for divine worship and for the family.4 4
Thus, one discovers, as one listens to discussions of particular
problems today, that underlying invocations of the right to privacy are certain old-fashioned notions about love (or desire for
life) and wisdom (or justice) and piety (or honor), notions which
it may no longer be fashionable to make explicit but which nevertheless continue to have some salutary effect in a decent community. To invoke privacy considerations may not be the best
way to discuss such problems - for privacy considerations are
likely to be most individualistic in their tendency and to be isolated from the centuries of disciplined analysis accompanying the
more old-fashioned standards. Even so, the invocation of privacy
considerations may be one immediately practical way of discussing certain problems, inasmuch as people can be induced to respond sympathetically to this approach to contemporary problems. In a sense, then, fire can be used to fight fire.45
they are unduly intrusive with respect to many of the categories of public servants now subject to them ....
Consider the attempt, in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2 to work from traditional
property concepts.
On the relation of property to liberty (and hence to privacy?) see Anastaplo, Book
Review, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 273 (1977); note 34 supra. See also THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra
note 3, at 213-17, 672.
A modern Greek proverb reminds us of one of the intimate charms of property: "In
another's house, one is a blind man." See also THUCYDIDES, PELOPONNESIAN WAR II 3-4.
We should be reminded as well of the warning implicit in the opinion of the Court in
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625-26 (1951):
All declare for liberty and proceed to disagree among themselves as to its true
meaning. There is equal unanimity that opportunists, for private gain, cannot
be permitted to arm themselves with an acceptable principle, such as that of a
right to work, a privilege to engage in interstate commerce, or a free press, and
proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their path by crushing the living
rights of others to privacy and repose.
See notes 8 & 16 supra.
44. For a suggestion of the tension between divine worship and family ties, see PLATO,
EUTHYPHRO. Compare notes 40 & 42 supra.
45. The public is vitally interested in the private in two ways: it wants to see it protected (for some public, as well as for private reasons); but it also wants to see it (that is,
to invade it, if only for titillation). Thus, people are often willing, if not eager, to see
someone else's privacy diminished. See, e.g., M. Royko, "That 'nothing to hide' game,"
Chi. Daily News, Mar. 31, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 1. Anne Morrow Lindberg has observed
that "fame" may be "a kind of death." Chi. Sun-Times, Jun. 25, 1977, § 1, at 35. See
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The thoughtful citizen distinguishes, however, between rhetoric which takes due account of circumstances, on the one hand,
and the standard of virtue and happiness to which that rhetoric
should be dedicated, on the other hand. We are, I have suggested
in this introduction to the public interest in privacy, more apt to
speak and act responsibly on behalf of a decent community if we
realize both the limitations of appeals to privacy and the reason
why such appeals may be somewhat effective today."
notes 8 supra and 47 infra.
Even so, privacy causes do tend to arouse support that cuts across traditional political
differences. (Perhaps this is partly because abandonment of the old way is another facet
of the modem desire for privacy: that is, we want to be able to "live our own lives." See
note 51 infra. Consider, for example, how the American Civil Liberties Union and one of
its severest critics can team up on occasion. NATIONAL REVIEw 218 (Aug. 29, 1975).
During the 1940's and 1950's a right to privacy (in the form of the privilege against selfincrimination) was sometimes invoked as protection against attempted invasions by government investigators of the right to freedom of speech. Thus, the more self-centered Fifth
Amendment was successfully resorted to in place of the First. See, on those troubled times,
HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 105-114, 283-88; THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra
note 3, at 331-418.
In any event, one can, in the course of privacy discussions, deal plausibly with other,
even more important, matters.
46. On privacy and the law, see Kurland, The PrivateI: Some Reflections on Privacy
and the Constitution, 10 UNIV. OF CHI. RECORD 107 (July 19, 1976). It would require another
article to develop the salutary case to be made against the mode of constitutional interpretation and legal argument (orthodox though it may be) employed by Mr. Kurland in his
useful article. A series of quotations from his article should suffice to suggest what I
consider in need of corrective comment:
[(a)] In whatever form, strict construction has never been anything more than
a rhetorical tool. In part, this is due to the fact that many of the phrases of the
Constitution do not lend themselves to simplistic readings. . . . Constitutional
limitations, like all law, are a reflection of a society. The law does not create
the society, society creates the law. (Id. at 110).
[(b)] The arcane aspect of American constitutional law, then, derives from the
fact that the Constitution is largely a document of the imagination but is always
treated as if it were real. (Id.)
[(c)] And the very notion of the national Constitution is that there are aspects
of individual behavior that no government, federal or state, could subject to
control. To the best of their not inconsiderable ability, the authors of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights detailed those areas. (Id. at 118).
1(d)] If the Declaration of Independence which we are so assiduously celebrating this year were a constitutional document . . . . (Id. at 116).
[(e)] Every law that compels a person to do what he would not choose to do is
or should be constitutionally suspect. (Id. at 119).
[(f)] For, from the beginning, this country has seen the contest between the
ideals of Jefferson and the principles of Hamilton resolved in favor of the latter.
(Id. at 123.).
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To assume as I do that there are standards which we share with
ancient citizens assumes also that there is in most men a deeprooted sense of justice, a sense of justice which tends to have its
effect (if one has been raised in a decent community) despite the
relativistic opinions of the day. That is, we are again obliged to
notice the dictates of nature in human affairs.17
The more we examine the enduring standards invoked by men
- the more we examine those standards in the light of what the
common good calls for in particular circumstances - the more
[(g)l Excuse me, my biases are showing. (Id. at 121.).
Compare, Anastaplo, The Declarationof Independence, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 390 (1965);
THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3,at 15-16, 454, 582-84, 764; "American Constitutionalism and the Virtue of Prudence" in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (L. deAlvarez ed. 1976). Compare also, Wollan, Jr.
Crosskey's Once and Future Constitution, 5 POLL. Sci. REVIEWER 129 (1975); H. JAFFA,
CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959); H. JAFFA, THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 149f (1975);
West, Book Review, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 278 (1977); M. Bradford & G. Anastaplo, "Slavery
and the Constitution - A Conversation," Univ. Dallas Politics Dept. Newsletter, 1
(Spring 1977).
A recent review of Supreme Court privacy rulings may be found in Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 45 U.S.L.W. 4601 (1977). See also Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 45 U.S.L.W. 4917 (1977); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1410 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973); note 39 supra.
There is now available the Report to Congress and the President by the Privacy Protection Study Commission created by the Privacy Act of 1974. PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977).
47. It may be of some significance that the Illinois Privacy Commission devoted itself
primarily to the development of proposed legislation, not to straightforward educational
efforts. The recourse to lawmaking in such matters may be distinctively modern, particularly since it is more generally assumed today than formerly that whatever the community
does not trouble to proscribe by law is entirely up to the individual to do with as he
pleases. See HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at 294.
On the other hand, the Commission did refer to certain problems (for example, with
respect to "lie detectors and other surveillance techniques") as "touchfing] upon the
most elementary, perhaps even natural, sence of privacy..." FINAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 48. See also THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 308-10. Compare J. CRoPSEY,
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ISSUES OF POLITICS 181-82 (1977).
A revealing photograph of an actress is circulated without her knowledge. She protests
- and the protest is duly reported by a national magazine which also publishes the
offending photography, thereby giving it much more circulation than it originally had.
NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1977, at 65; June 13, 1977, at 9 (a reader protests). See notes 8, 13,
25 & 45 supra. See also Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 1966 L. CONT. PROB. 326.
Would not privacy abuses be somewhat moderated in this country if journalists were
better trained? See I. SPARROW, CONTROVERSIAL ESSAYS, 21 (1966).
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likely we are to be responsible (as well as effective) in our invocations in public councils today of "the right to privacy." In addition, we are more apt to be able to understand what is really going
on - and thereby better able to know ourselves."

VI.
We can, in our effort to know ourselves, consider further what
human nature means and how the Greek and Biblical teachings
already referred to bear on that meaning, by examining in some
detail a poem by Edwin Muir. We can consider, that is, how one
of the best poets of the century draws upon that fusion of the
48. The Illinois Privacy Commission, in introducing its proposed Public Records Access
Act, made these observations:
A self-governing people needs to know, and to believe itself to know, what its
government is doing. This requires that there routinely be made available to it
information which is held and used by public servants. Such information is also
needed if citizens are to be able to protect their rights intelligently, including
their rights to privacy, and to make proper use of government services.
Public servants, in exercising the powers and in performing the duties entrusted to them, depend upon the confidence of the community. They cannot
be sure of such confidence if the people at large remain uninformed, or believe
themselves to be uninformed, about what is being done in government and why.
The known availability of public records can do much to remove causes of
suspicion and cynicism in a community, thereby allowing public servants to get
on with their work.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 40. The Commission goes on to explain:
The bill is different in several important respects from comparable legislation
elsewhere. There is in the bill substantial provision for the personal privacy of
citizens, except where there is a critical public interest in disclosure. The problem of how to protect personal information from inappropriate access by the
general public is dealt with inadequately by all of the legislation of this type
reviewed by this Commission. For this reason, the manner in which the bill deals
with the personal privacy interest should be emphasized.
Thus, unlike the other exemptions contained in the bill - which for the most
part may, but need not, be invoked by public officials in denying public access
to certain documents -, this bill prohibits the public inspection or copying of
information "the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal
privacy unless there is a compelling, demonstrable and overriding public interest in disclosure or such disclosure is expressly required by applicable law or is
consented to in writing by the individual subject of such information." Furthermore, individuals may file suit in Circuit Court for relief against a violation of
the provision protecting personal privacy.
Id. at 41-42. See also note 8 supra.
See Belair, Less Government Secrecy and More Personal Privacy? Civ. LB. REv. 10
(May/June 1977); Miller, The Privacy Act: More Confusion than Protection, THE
PROGRESSVE 30 (May 1976).
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Hebrew and Greek sources - the Biblical and the philosophical
sources - which we know as Western civilization:"
The Animals
They do not live in the world,
Are not in time and space.
From birth to death hurled
No word do they have, not one
To plant a foot upon,
Were never in any place.
For with names the world was called
Out of the empty air,
With names was built and walled,
Line and circle and 'square,
Dust and emerald;
Snatched from deceiving death
By the articulate breath.
But these have never trod
Twice the familiar track,
Never never turned back
Into the memoried day.
All is new and near
In the unchanging Here
Of the fifth great day of God,
That shall remain the same,
Never shall pass away.
On the sixth day we came.
Much is made in the poem of "they." Indeed, almost all of the
poem is devoted to the unnamed and unspeaking "they." Only
in the last line of the poem does someone other than "they" come
upon the scene: "On the sixth day we came." The narrator, it
seems, is one of those who came on the sixth day.
Little is said explicitly about "we." But everything that has
gone before is, to some extent, about "we" as well as about
"they." We are the ones, for instance, who do live in the world,
who do have access to the word, who make use of names and
hence who know of and know death. Indeed, it can be said, we
49. E. MUIR, COLLECTED POEMS 1921-1951 at 192 (1953). See note 30 supra and note 50
infra. See also THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 556.
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and only we are the ones who really live. In saying this, however,
I anticipate our careful reading of this poem.
Here, again, are the first two lines:
They do not live in the world,
Are not in time and space.
The subsequent twenty lines - that is, all the remaining lines
but the last one - can be understood as an explication of these
first two, a development of what is said here. When it is said that
they do not live in the world, does that mean that they do not live
at all? The "world" is referred to, not the "earth;" perhaps they
are associated with the earth, something which may be less the
product of thought, of consciousness, than is the world. Perhaps,
also, time and space are dependent on intellect or perception.
Does genuine living take time and require space?
To say that they do not live, however, is not to say that they
have no existence at all. Existence, the barest of existence, is
suggested in the next line:
From birth to death hurled
There is a beginning and end for these things - do they
selves perceive birth and death? - but there is for them no
ment on their own, no order, no serenity, no moment for
tion. To be hurled suggests what happens to something
mate, such as a rock.

themmovereflecinani-

No word do they have, not one
To plant a foot upon,
Were never in any place.
They do not, it seems, stand or walk: they have no place to plant
a foot upon. Perhaps they do not even have a foot. (Paws and
hooves are not really feet?) Words, it seems, are critical for standing. Genuine existence - being somewhere and sometime - it
also seems, depends on words. Without the understanding that
words make possible, and stand for, there can be no meaningful
existence.
This is spelled out in the seven lines which immediately follow.
The first two lines of this most abstract stanze of the poem read:
For with names the world was called
Out of the empty air,
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This takes us back to the first line: there is, without words without names - no world for them to live in. Genesis seems to
be drawn upon. Was the original Creation a kind of naming?
Certainly, Adam's naming of his fellow creatures is called to
mind. (Is to call something to mind to make it or only to discover
it, to realize it?) The world itself did not really exist before there
were names - names, those most potent of words, those words
which permit identification and hence full being.
The potency of the name words, in filling the empty air, is
recognized in the next line:
With names was built and walled,
That is to say, with names the world was built and walled - in
this sense it was called out of the empty air. And what the world
means here is indicated in the two following lines:
Line and circle and square,
Dust and emerald;
These are the things the world is made up of: circles and squares
are variations of lines; emeralds are one variation of dust. These
are the simple things and their most complex manifestations,
things both immaterial and material, the forms and the matter,
out of which the world is made. To speak of dust and emerald and not, say, of atoms - is to speak from a human (and natural?)
rather than a scientific (and artificial?) perspective.
All this prepares us for the central line of the poem and its
immediate aftermath:
Snatched from deceiving death
By the articulate breath.
What, one must wonder, is snatched from deceiving death? The
world, it would seem, and the things in it. The articulate breath
-

words, especially names -

does something about death. It

may not simply abolish death, but it can nullify the deception of
death, if only the deception (for the inarticulate) that death is
like everything else, that there is nothing special about it. That
is, it may be only the articulate, and hence the knowing, who
recognize death for what it is -

who recognize it -

and who

thereby really live, if only for awhile. Thus, death, too, is named
- and seen for what it truly is. Perhaps, also, unexamined death
promises rest. But may not only personal oblivion follow? Names
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may salvage something from such oblivion. Perhaps, as well,
those who do not understand do not even know that they die: they
are deceived as to - ignorant of - what becomes of them. One
can somehow live only when one learns one dies? To become
articulate is to have the breath of life, the spirit, added to one's
material existence.
To know that one dies, to live, can mean that both past and
future have meaning. Consider, however, the plight of the inarticulate. Here we return to the "they" of the opening lines:
But these have never trod
Twice the familiar track,
Never never turned back
Into the memoried day.
There is for "these" no memory, nothing truly familiar - even
though all they do is trod the familiar track, repeating themselves
by a kind of instinct. Indeed, there may be for them no real
distinction between themselves and the track they trod, between
themselves and others (whether other animate or even inanimate
things). Or, put another way, they have no sense of identity, to
say nothing of individuality or a sense of privacy. Or, put still
another way, they never recall what they have done and they
never knowingly repeat themselves, although they do little but
repeat themselves.
They are all they will ever be when they begin: what they will
be is intrinsic to them from the outset. It is this we call instinct.
And it is this which seems to be reflected in the lines which
follow:
All is new and near
In the unchanging Here
Of the fifth great day of God,
That shall remain the same,
Never shall pass away.
"New and near" are the most they can partake of "time and
space." There is for them no past, no future, only the
"unchanging Here." Their day, their time, is such that (for them)
it never changes, it never passes away' They may pass on, or seem
to, but they are replaced imperceptively and unperceivingly by
others like themselves. Perhaps (one can say) it is for them the
same whether they emerge from sleep or from birth.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:767

The "fifth great day" is not really theirs, even though they
depend upon it. Indeed, there are for them no days at all. Certainly, there is for them no realization of what has come before:
all is always present before them. If they adapt to changing circumstances, it is not with any awareness of what or where they
have been or of what lies ahead. Everything can change around
them - but since they cannot make comparisons, nothing
changes. Thus, they are in their changelessness God-like; but in
an even more critical respect they are not God-like, for they do
not understand at all.
Who "they" are is, of course, confirmed by the invocation of the
fifth day. But, we should recall from the first chapter of Genesis,
the creation of the fifth day extended into the sixth day. From
the perspective of the unreasoning, however, there is no difference
between the fifth and the sixth days: the fish and fowl are created
on the fifth day, the land creatures on the sixth. For this reason,
perhaps, it is called the "fifth great day of God": what is essential to that day's creation continues into the sixth day. (That the
fish, fowl and land creatures are to be considered together may
be seen in the fact that it is three times said in Genesis that they
are given under the dominion of man. These three kinds of creatures share a wordless character.)
Although the land creatures came on the sixth day, things remained as they had been on the fifth day - until "we came." One
price of eternity, of changelessness, it seems, is lack of development, of understanding, of what we call "individuality." And
with us came, among other things, names. We are the naming
creatures. We can reason (with poetry a particularly intense, beguiling and hence instructive form of naming). Not much has to
be said about what happens with us: we can speak for ourselves.
A sample of what and how we think may be found in the twentytwo lines of the poem which set the stage for the final line:
On the sixth day 'we came.
It is at this point, and not before, that "they" can be named by
us. That is, it is only for the entire poem that a name can be
provided, "The Animals."
Men, it would seem, can be regarded as animals with a profound difference. Or, put another way, that which is most animalistic about men (and which the thoughtless man exhibits) can be
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attributed to the fifth day; that which is truly human can be
attributed to the sixth day. (Does not the assignment of land
creatures to the sixth day reflect the realization that they among
the animals are most susceptible to, even if they are not themselves capable of, the reasoning power of men?)
Only on the sixth day do there emerge creatures capable of selfconsciousness and hence of full realization. Is it not in this sense
that man can be said to have been created in the image of God?
Only man can imitate, if only imperfectly, what God does with
that uncovering (or discovery) of the nature of things which we
call creation. (Is it not such uncovering that the more persistent
"invasions of privacy" attempt to imitate?)
The animals, on the other hand, are like rocks (whether dust
or emerald) in one critical respect: they continue unaware, and
hence unchanging, from beginning to end. This is not to say that
the animals are of no consequence. Not only is animality vital to
what is man, but this poet, as is evident in other poems of his,
respects the animals, even preferring them in some ways to men.
But there is not in animals more than the dimmest awareness of
death - and hence there can be for them nothing poetic. A lively
awareness of death makes a full life possible. Tragedy, one form
of the poetic, helps make death endurable for most men.
I return to my remarks about the poet's use of his sources. The
emphasis in this poem seems to be Greek, but within the framework provided by the Hebrew Bible. The Hebrew influence may
be seen, of course, in the account of the Creation taken from
Genesis. This account is restated, so to speak, in the opening lines
of The Gospel of John, with its emphasis on the importance of the
Word. This emphasis can be said to reflect the Greek understanding of things.
VII.
We have, in our inquiry into the problem of privacy, considered
the meaning of human nature and the role played in the life of
man by reason, by the power men have to uncover what is hidden
from view.'"
50. To speak, as I did in concluding my commentary on the Muir poem, of "the Greek
understanding of things" is to bring to mind philosophy - and this, in turn, reminds us
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We have yet to consider explicitly what standards of right and
wrong there may be available to guide men in their actions, including in their determinations of what is to be uncovered, by
whom and how. It does seem that the good, upon which determinations of right and wrong depend, has become something of a
problem for us.
We make much today of something called openmindedness.
But should we not take care lest a civilized willingness to hear out
arguments become nothing more than a perverse mindlessness?
One is asked again and again by liberated intellectuals, especially when serious matters are under discussion, "Who is to say
who is right?" This tiresome rhetorical question usually implies
that one is entitled to do no more than express the preferences
of the ancient struggle for supremacy between philosophy and poetry. One complaint
lovers of poems, if not poets themselves, have is against those of philosophical inclinations
who subject poetry to an inappropriate analysis, an analysis which draws too much on the
rational and not enough on the instinctive - which draws too much (one might even
suggest, speaking poetically) on the Sixth Day, and not enough on the Fifth. See
NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY. Compare HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5, at
135-38. Compare also Anastaplo, THE ARTIST As THINKER (to be published by Swallow
Press).
See, as bearing on Muir's "The Animals," Thomas Hardy's "Heredity;" Essay No. 17,
"On Death: One by One, Yet All Together," in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5;
Shakespeare, THE TEMPEST, I, ii, 1. 351-56. The following discussion by Muir bears both
on poetry and on the human sensibilities required for and served by a proper respect for
privacy:
• . . Now that we buy in shops shoulders of beef, loaves, chairs, beds, pots and
pans, automobiles, and refrigerators, almost everything that has become necessary or convenient for us, we are eased of a great deal of labor, and have lost
touch with a world of experience. I am not advocating a return to a past that
has gone forever, or romanticizing the coarseness of peasant life, or its poverty
and hardship. All I want to suggest is that the vast dissemination of secondary
objects isolates us from the natural World in a way which is new to mankind,
and that this cannot help affecting our sensibilities and our imagination. It is
possible to write a poem about horses, for, apart from the work they do for us,
they have a life of their own; it is impossible to write a poem about motor cars,
except in the false rhetorical vein, for they have no life except what we give them
by pushing a starter. The finished article is finished in a final sense; sometimes
we can admire its functional beauty, but it is impervious to the imagination.
This artificial world which we have made out of the world, the monotony of the
work which produces it, the abundance of the distractions which vainly try to
make up for that monotony - all these things, it seems to me, help to explain
the depressed state of poetry, and the present neglect of it. Poetry flourishes
when there is a public with a natural affinity for it.

E. MUIR,

THE ESTATE OF POETRY 8-9 (1960). Compare note 34 supra.
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one happens to have. To pass judgment on another - to speak
of right and wrong - is considered provincial, if not bigoted.
"Right" and "wrong," as well as "good" and "bad," are explained away by the liberated as merely conventional ways of
indicating one's preferences, the preferences determined (for the
most part, if not altogether) by one's environment. Indeed, these
advanced thinkers are incapable of any sustained argument, independent of "arbitrary" religious and legal prohibitions, against
even such a practice as (to take an extreme case) a routine indulgence in cannibalism.
Such openminded people (who, of course, happen personally to
abhor cannibalism and other such social aberrations) do consider
themselves thinkers. That is, the old-fashioned respect - perhaps an almost instinctive respect - for man's nature continues
to assert itself in their implicit assumption that thinking is both
possible and desirable. Thus, it is assumed proper, if not necessary, for men and women to attempt to think. Is it not also assumed that there are correct and incorrect conclusions following
from the thinking one might attempt?
Many openminded people do have decided opinions critical of
social injustice (including improper invasions of privacy), of bigotry, and (perhaps above all) of those who are not openminded.
But why should one bother to complain about what others are (or
are not) doing or saying if right and wrong are but matters of
opinion, if men have no defensible basis for the choices they make
about the good and the bad? Why should one bother to try to
"improve" things if one's preferences cannot be other than a matter of chance?
A matter of chance? If one's preferences are decisively determined by one's environment, and if one's environment and hence
upbringing are essentially matters of chance, what basis is there
for preferring or promoting one kind of environment over another,
for preferring one set of preferences over another? Will not whatever we change into be as much subject to chance (with its successor eventually becoming as appealing to some partisans) as whatever we may now happen to be? So, again, why bother to change
things?
Why bother, if there is not something in the nature of man
which demands (or at least permits) an ordering of alternatives,
which suggests a hierarchy of better and worse ways of shaping,
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developing and preserving both men and their communities?
What sense does it make to speak of "progress" if men do not
have some sense - if only a dim awareness - of what the very
best would be for human beings?5
51. Genuine progress, rooted in nature and in an awareness of the good, is measured
by standards which are to some extent outside (above?) individual feelings, personal
opinions and the sense of self. Since, according to this understanding of progress, what is
good is not merely a matter of how one happens to feel, it follows that the private should
not be made much of in ordinary circumstances. That is, privacy does tend to be unduly
self-centered: one is to be let alone to do as one pleases. See notes 39 and 45 supra. See
also THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 3, at 777-78. (Philosophy, on the other hand,
means that one who is properly equipped should be allowed, if not even obliged, to work
toward certain goals. See notes 23, 31 and 41 supra.)
A talk entitled "Martin Luther King and the Soul of America", that I prepared for a
University of Chicago conference on April 7, 1968 (three days after Mr. King was murdered), bears on the meaning of progress and its relation to nature and the good:
Much remains to be done. It is said, moreover, that little if anything has been
done to secure for all Americans the rights to which all are entitled. When the
impatient young say this, one can understand their mistake. When their elders
say this, they are not only mistaken, they are irresponsible: for they not only
mislead the young but they even deny the possibility of any progress at all, since
they thereby deny there are standards by which the direction of permanent
change can be charted. To disparage what has already been done will eventually
discourage further deliberate effort since it will undermine among us faith in the
power of reason to shape our affairs.
We have heard much the past few days of our "sick society," of American
repudiation of its principles, of the inability of the United States to face up to
its serious problems. It is natural, in one sense, for men to believe the worst when
one of their best is murdered. But it is also natural, in the finest sense, to
examine things properly so as to be able to understand what the circumstances
are in which one finds oneself.
Had someone in Martin Luther King's position in his community been murdered a generation ago, there would not have been the public response there is
this weekend: the President might not even have noticed the event; certainly,
the country would not have stopped, with flags at half-mast, to mourn his death;
the white mayor of Atlanta would not, immediately upon hearing the news from
Memphis, have driven the victim's wife to the airport. A sensitivity to Negro
rights and a concern for Negro opinion compel the public response we have
witnessed and which we join in our own way this Sunday morning.
Some will say that whites express grief merely to turn away anger on the part
of Negroes. It is no doubt prudent to make such grief evident. But one must take
care in talking about this matter lest the effort to repudiate destructive white
racism legitimate and encourage black racism, which is no more fair or healthy
for the community. One must take care, for instance, to challenge the repeated
insistence that the murder of Mr. King has been committed by White America,
that we all had a finger on that trigger, that we are all responsible for the events
of this week. Such talk should remind us of the hate-twisted determination of
the white racist to ascribe to all Negroes the crimes of a minority. We should
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be reminded as well that Martin Luther King stood where he did in the estimation of the world in large part because of the support and respect he enjoyed in
his lifetime from many white Americans.
The decisive initial steps toward Negro enfranchisement, it should be remembered, were taken by white men: by the authors of the Declaration of Independence, who proclaimed to a skeptical world the authoritative American doctrine
that all men are created equal; by the authors of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, who gave that
doctrine concrete application; and by the authors of the Supreme Court opinion
of 1954, who have insured that the best opinion of the community stands irrevocably behind the determination to see these American constitutional principles
applied. Many men-black and white alike-prepared the stage for the Court's
opinion, which, more than anything else in recent years, has marked out the
path the American people are now bound to follow. Desperate acts of violence
by demented men, encouraged by the bigotry of others who should know better,
will not change the course we must take in these matters, a now irreversible
course that is reinforced by the steadily growing and increasingly self-conscious
power of the Negro electorate.
Martin Luther King's great talent in his decade-long career was to exploit for
his purpose the resources he had at hand, the principles of the Constitution and
of the Declaration of Independence and the imagery of the Old Testament and
of the New. He could do what he did because he had at hand ancient aspirations
to fire an eloquence suited for his people. We, too, must make use of what we
have, what we have said, and what we have done. Indeed, I know of no country
which has made the progress in racial matters since the Second World War that
the United States has. It is neither honest nor helpful for us-and especially for
intellectuals-to debase and hence to cripple ourselves by refusing to recognize
in speech how far we have come, where we are, and where we are destined to
go. If one does not know what one is saying, that suggests that one does not
realize what one is doing either.
The United States knows that it has to do. It also knows that it has available,
despite its folly in Viet Nam, the resources with which to do it. Neither panic
nor distortion of the facts is of use to us. Progress can never be as fast as one
would like, because any political process worthy of free men must take into
account the lingering resistance of the ignorant as well as the insistent demands
of the just. If our judgments are unreasonable, we sacrifice what we could
gain-and we mislead the young and the ill-informed, condemning them to a
childish view of the world. The misguided adults who permitted their young to
roam the streets of our cities this weekend and to destroy their own neighborhoods did their community and their neighbors a disservice. One sees here the
danger of allowing to go unchallenged the irresponsible opinion that no significant progress has been made or is being made by the American Negro in the
only country he has. It should be acknowledged that the efforts this weekend in
Chicago by the often-negligent "establishment"-by the police and the army,
by firemen and city officials-surpassed not only in service to the community
but also in nobility of aspiration the activities of self-destructive rioters. We can
detect a connection, in the news reports, between the "silly smile" of Martin
Luther King's murderer and the senseless laughter of youngsters looting and
burning. Much more worthy of praise is the effort of organized gangs of youngsters to prevent the spread of senseless destruction to their own neighborhoods.
This heralds that political organization by Negroes which will secure for them
*heir rightful share in the governing of their country.
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Perhaps, then, we ought to replace openmindedness by simplemindedness. The paralyzing openmindedness criticized here depends upon and reinforces a determined, if not suicidal, thoughtlessness. A certain simplemindedness, on the other hand, may at
least have the merit of acknowledging the primacy of the reason,
and hence of thinking, in human affairs.
Who is to say who is right? The simpleminded answer is,
"Whoever knows what is right." But, it should at once be recognized, there are all kinds of foolish people who believe themselves
to know what is right. Is not even this, however, a reflection of
man's natural yearning for, and perhaps openness to, goodness
and truth? (Beauty, I suggest in passing, may be the pleasureinducing manifestation, often in corporeal form, of the good or of
the true.)
We must distinguish, therefore, between those who know what
is right and those who mistakenly believe themselves to know. It
is one thing to recognize that it is often difficult to know what is
right or good; it is quite another to conclude from this longfamiliar difficulty that it is always impossible to know what is
right or good. To recognize this vital distinction, as well as the
perils of unexamined dogmatism, is to give ourselves a chance to
Mr. King preached a doctrine of dedicated non-violence-a doctrine supported in his speeches by arguments both principled and pragmatic. There is
one further argument, however, which should also be noticed by anyone who
cares for his Negro friends and for the soul of America, and that has to do with
the dreadful vulnerability of our Negro fellow-citizens (an easily identifiable
minority) if the "confrontation" in this country between black and white should
really be taken to the streets. I have long doubted that provocative marches
through the streets of our cities, in the name of freedom of speech, constitute a
right that any community is obliged to permit to be exercised, especially where
other means of communication (culminating in the ballot-box) are available. In
any event, anyone of stature who is at the center of bitter controversy has the
duty-for the good of his people and of his potential murderers, if not of himself
or of. his family-to take reasonable pracautions for his physical safety.
Good men have always been hard to find: We are entitled to keep them alive as
long as possible, once we have been so fortunate as to discover them and to raise
them up for all the world to admire. Especially is this so when, as now, much
remains to be done.
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1123b3-7. See also, "Race, Law and Civilization,"
in HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 5; note 11 supra. On nuclear violence and a due
regard for humanity see Anastaplo, Book Review, Chi. Sun-Times, June 26, 1977, at 8
(Showcase/BookWeek).
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begin to understand what can indeed be known and done about
human beings.52
52. Such understanding, to which serious education (such as that attempted by St.
John's College) should be directed, rests upon (1) an array of refined intellectual skills
(as well as psychic maturity); (2) a body of carefully-sifted information (including information about the obvious and the self-evident, as well as about the apparently selfevident); and, (3) an awareness of the fundamental questions thoughtful men have always
recognized to be worthy of repeated investigation.
To approach seriously what can be "done about human beings" is to direct our attention
to the question of the appropriate "relation of the individual to the community." That
relation is examined in a review I once had occasion to prepare of Elmer Gertz's To LIFE
(1974). That review follows:
Elmer Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney and a very nice man, has written
a lively account of his busy career which has been devoted "full time to the
practice of law, full time to the teaching of law and full time to writing." He
has in his many books and articles "tried to write with a dual purpose in
mind-to give those legally trained an adequate account of celebrated litigation,
and to interest laymen, completely unfamiliar with the technicalities of our
craft." He has certainly succeeded in writing an interesting book which one can
read with pleasure and to which one can and should return with profit to think
through the many serious problems he touches upon.
Mr. Gertz's clients have included Nathan Leopold, Henry Miller and Jack
Ruby. His libertarian efforts, both legal and political, have made contributions
to the law of obscenity, the law of libel, civil rights litigation against police
excesses, racial integration, the Illinois constitution, Chicago public housing,
and (perhaps most deeply felt by him) the suspension of capital punishment.
He observes that he "wanted to have cases worth winning, cases with substance
and meaning beyond fees earned." This desire has certainly been realized in the
course of his full and rich life.
His chapter on capital punishment, stressing as it does the arbitrariness of
our recourse in recent decades to such punishment, is particularly valuable. It
is there that his zest for life finds its most fervent expression-the zest of the
Hebrew toast (L'chayim, "To Life") from which the book's title is taken. It is
in this chapter also that readers may be most challenged, as Mr. Gertz would
want them to be, by the general position implied in his writings on the relation
of the individual to the community.
It must be noticed, first, that the more serious arguments for recourse to
capital punishment in carefully defined circumstances are not faced up to by
most opponents today of capital punishment. Is it mere prejudice which still
disposes so many of our fellow citizens to believe that some criminals deserve
to be executed, that natural justice calls for such retribution? Can such public
sentiment safely be disregarded? Certainly, it is difficult to see capital punishment as "cruel and unusual" (in the sense of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution), however plausible the argument against it may be on due process
or equal protection grounds because of the highly fortuitous character of its use.
Is there not a sense in which recourse to capital punishment reasserts among a
people the claims of community and thereby the seriousness with which it takes
its duties, its prerogatives and its vulnerability? There may be better ways for
a community to express such concerns-but this one is not simply inconsequen-
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Thus, we have returned to the question which, it seems to me,
underlies the contemporary concern with and any useful expansion of the right to privacy: what kind of people should we want
to be? Or, put another way, what kind of community is most apt
in our circumstances to produce citizens and human beings who
do not require special legislation to induce in them both a proper
respect for and a responsible use of privacy?
tial or simply barbaric in all circumstances.
The problem of "community" is raised as well by Mr. Gertz's permissiveness
with respect to obscenity. Is not the community entitled and even obliged to try
to shape its citizens by supervising to some degree public arts and entertainment
(as distinguished from the discussion of political issues)? Mr. Gertz recognizes
the proper role of law and of public education with respect to racial discrimination: "When people learn that the law forbids discrimination, they will eventually learn not to discriminate at all. When the practice of discrimination disappears, the roots of prejudice of which it was an expression will eventually wither
and die." He also recognizes the strength and integrity of the immigrants he
knew as a boy and of his Jewish forebears. But does not such character depend
upon a community determined and empowered to establish and maintain decent standards of sentiment as well as of action?
Mr. Gertz can speak sensitively of the many remarkable people, both famous
and obscure, he considers himself privileged to have known and served. What
he does not address himself to, however, is the coarsening effect among us of
the new permissiveness, a coarsening which Mr. Gertz does not himself share.
Thus, one hears today intelligent men and women casually using language, in
mixed company and even at the dinner table, which would have been considered
unbecoming in a barracks a generation ago. What can and should be done about
such developments? What, indeed, are the rights and requirements of
community?
In short, one may be usefully provoked by this libertarian book to ask: What
does this gifted author understand as legitimately available to our community
if it is to shape authoritatively, in the generations to come, lawyers and other
citizens as human, conscientious and humane as Elmer Gertz is revealed in
these pages to be?
Several aspects of matters which bear upon the public interest in privacy are usefully
anticipated in this review. See also notes 29 and 42 supra.
To speak as I have on this occasion of nature is to challenge the relativistic presuppositions of many intellectuals with respect to both the truth and the good. See notes 27 & 41
supra. That is, to speak as I have is to suggest that many things are not good because
they are normal but rather normal because they are good.

